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Essays on Unemployment Policies
Ofer Setty
Chapter 1: Optimal Unemployment Insurance 
with Monitoring
Public spending on labor market policies was on aver-
age 1.6 percent of output in industrialized countries in 2001 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
2005). These labor market policies can be divided into pas-
sive and active policies. Passive policies, such as constant 
benefi ts to the unemployed, are mainly concerned with 
the welfare of the unemployed worker, while active poli-
cies, such as job-search monitoring and training, are mainly 
concerned with increasing the unemployment exit rate. In the 
last three decades, active labor market policies have gained a 
higher share of the total spending on labor policies and have 
received increased attention as governments seek to insure 
unemployed workers without damaging their incentives for 
becoming employed.
Given that additional policy instruments such as job-
search monitoring are available and are implemented by 
governments, it is important to model these instruments, 
to examine the extent to which these instruments increase 
the effi ciency of unemployment insurance programs, and 
to compare existing policies to the optimal policy. This is a 
nontrivial task since such instruments, as valuable as they 
may be, are also costly.
In practice, monitoring requires the unemployed worker 
to record his job-search activities, typically by listing the 
employers he contacted in a given period. At the employment 
offi ce, a caseworker evaluates occasionally whether the job-
search requirements are met, for example, by verifying that 
the contacts are authentic. If the caseworker fi nds the report 
unsatisfactory, then she may impose sanctions, usually in the 
form of benefi ts reduction for a limited period.
The objective of this chapter is to model monitoring in the 
framework of optimal unemployment insurance developed 
by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), and to characterize the 
optimal allocation in the presence of monitoring. In Hopen-
hayn and Nicolini, a risk-neutral planner—the govern-
ment—insures a risk-averse worker against unemployment 
by setting transfers during unemployment and a wage tax or 
a subsidy during employment. During unemployment, the 
worker searches for a job by exerting an effort level that is 
his private information. The fi rst best, had the planner been 
able to observe the information, is to deliver to the worker 
constant benefi ts regardless of the employment status. How-
ever, since the planner cannot observe the job-search effort 
level, constant benefi ts would fl aw the worker’s incentives to 
search for a job. Therefore, to solve the incentive-insurance 
trade-off, benefi ts during unemployment should continu-
ously decrease and the wage tax upon reemployment should 
continuously increase.
  I incorporate monitoring into the optimal unemployment 
insurance framework as follows. The planner monitors the 
unemployed worker with some history-dependent probabil-
ity. When a worker is monitored, the planner pays a cost and 
receives a signal that is correlated with the job-search effort 
of the worker. The planner uses that signal to improve the 
effi ciency of the contract by conditioning future payments 
and the wage tax, not only on the employment outcome, but 
also on the signal. These future values create endogenous 
sanctions and rewards that, together with the random moni-
toring, create effective job-search incentives: the worker 
exerts a high job-search effort level in order to increase the 
probability of a good signal, and consequently to increase the 
probability of higher payments.
I fi nd that at the constrained optimum, the planner chooses 
for each type of unemployed worker a specifi c combination 
of monitoring frequency and sanction severity: as the gener-
osity of the welfare system increases, the planner monitors 
the unemployed more frequently but imposes lower sanc-
tions. This policy pattern is linked to the worker’s risk aver-
sion. As the generosity of the welfare system increases, the 
planner fi nds it more costly to sanction the worker because 
the reward that is required to counterbalance a given sanction 
increases with the level of promised utility. At the same time, 
the cost of acquiring the monitoring signal is fi xed in units of 
consumption, and therefore the planner shifts gradually from 
applying severe sanctions at a low probability to applying 
less severe sanctions at a higher probability.
The second objective of the chapter is to estimate the 
value of the additional instrument of monitoring by compar-
ing the results of the model to the results of a model where 
monitoring technology is unavailable. I fi nd that when com-
paring the two models at a balanced budget (zero net cost for 
the planner), monitoring decreases the variance of consump-
tion by about two-thirds and eliminates roughly half of the 
government’s cost of the model without monitoring.
The third objective is to contrast the actual monitoring 
policy in the United States with the optimal scheme and as-
sess the gain from shifting to the optimal scheme.
Figure 1 shows the levels of consumption for both the op-
timal and actual policies for a worker who starts unemployed 
and goes through the following fi ve states: 1) nonmonitored 
unemployment, 2) monitored unemployment with a good 
signal, 3) nonmonitored unemployment, 4) monitored unem-
ployment with a bad signal, and 5) employment, denoted as 
the sequence {n,g,n,b,e}. The top panel shows both policies 
on the same wide vertical scale. The bottom panel shows the 
optimal policy on a tighter vertical scale in order to empha-
size those variations in consumption that cannot be visual-
ized in the top panel. The sharp changes in consumption in 
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the actual policy, where the planner conditions only on the 
current state, are replaced by quite moderate changes in the 
optimal policy, where the planner conditions consumption on 
the complete history of the agent. Specifi cally, the one-time 
decrease of 23 percent in the monthly benefi t in the actual 
policy is replaced by a persistent decrease of only 5 percent 
in the optimal policy.
In order to estimate quantitatively the budget savings of 
moving from the actual policy to the optimal policy, I simu-
late both policies as follows. First, I simulate 5,000 workers 
across T = 60 months according to actual U.S. policy to fi nd 
the average cost for the planner and the expected utility de-
livered to the worker for the T periods. Then, I fi x an initial 
level of promised utility in the optimal policy to match the 
same level of expected utility as in the actual policy. Finally, 
I simulate the optimal scheme and fi nd its cost. The differ-
ence between the two costs is the gain for the planner from 
applying the optimal policy in the United States. Shifting to 
the optimal monitoring policy would save $521 per unem-
ployed worker per unemployment spell. These savings can 
be translated into an increase of 1.8 percent in consumption 
over time T. 
Chapter 2: Optimal Welfare Programs with 
Search, Work, and Training
(with Nicola Pavoni and Gianluca Violante)
This chapter extends the recent literature on government 
expenditure programs that combine different policies, called 
Welfare-to-Work (WTW) programs. In these programs, 
governments utilize the large variety of policy instruments 
targeting the unemployed, such as job-search aid, training, 
and unemployment insurance. Interestingly, governments 
use a mix of policy instruments for workers with different 
characteristics.
This chapter has three goals. First, we enlarge the set of 
instruments in the WTW literature that is available for the 
government toward unemployed workers. This variety of in-
struments is inspired by a unique dataset called the National 
Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies (NEWWS). This 
is a large-scale longitudinal study conducted by the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services between 1991 
and 1999. As part of the survey, 40,000 individuals in seven 
distinct U.S. locations were randomly assigned to various 
treatment-control groups. Two key programs or approaches 
were studied in this large-scale experiment.
In the fi rst approach, the labor force attachment (LFA) ap-
proach, individuals were encouraged to gain quick entry into 
the labor market, even at low wages. In the second approach, 
called the human capital development (HCD) approach, 
individuals were directed to avail themselves of education 
services, and to a lesser extent, occupational training before 
they sought work, under the theory that they would then be 
able to get better jobs.
To accommodate these two approaches we introduce 
into the model four technologies. The fi rst two are associ-
ated with both LFA and HCD approaches: search, where the 
worker is looking for a job on her own, and matching, where 
a caseworker assists the worker by creating an interview (a 
match) for the worker. The third technology, which is associ-
ated with the LFA approach, is secondary production, where 
the worker is producing a low output. The fourth technology, 
associated with the HCD approach, is training, targeted at 
increasing the human capital of the worker.
Three policies are included in both the LFA and the HCD 
sets of policies. The fi rst is Unemployment Insurance (UI), 
where the planner assigns the worker to the search technolo-
gy with high effort. The second is job-search aid (JA), where 
the planner uses the matching technology and the effort rec-
ommendation is low. The third policy that is joint to both sets 
of policies is social assistance (SA), where there is no use of 
technologies and the effort recommendation is low.
In the LFA set there are, in addition to these three policies, 
two unique policies that use secondary production technol-
ogy. The fi rst is mandatory work (MW), where the effort 
recommendation is high. The second unique policy to LFA is 
transitory work (TW), where the planner uses, in addition to 
the secondary production technology, the matching technol-
ogy, and the effort recommendation is high.
The HCD set of policies includes two unique policies as 
well. These policies use the training technology. The fi rst is 
formal training (FT), where the effort recommendation is 
high. The second unique policy to HCD is on-the-job train-
ing (OJT), where the planner uses, combined with the as-
signment to training, the matching technology, and the effort 
recommendation is high
Our analysis is different from the standard study of such 
technologies. First, one key input of the analysis is the 
technologies parameters, which are neglected in the standard 
one. Second, thanks to the structural framework, we take into 
account the direct costs and returns as well as the standard 
opportunity cost present in the standard analysis. We also 
take into account additional return (due to policy comple-
Figure 1  Simulated Consumption of the Optimal and 
Actual Monitoring Policies in the United States
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mentarity) and costs (due to policy crowding out) associated 
with the existence of the other policies.
In the model workers differ in the level of their human 
capital and their labor histories. Based on this heterogene-
ity, the second goal of the chapter is to identify which policy 
is appropriate for each type of worker and to describe the 
economic forces behind such choices. This is especially im-
portant given the rich set of policies that can be assigned to 
unemployed workers. To answer such questions, we charac-
terize the optimal sequence of policies and the optimal level 
and time-path of consumption, i.e., benefi ts during unem-
ployment, and taxes or subsidies upon reemployment.
Following Pavoni and Violante (2007), we characterize 
the optimal policy on a (U,h) state space. However, in order 
to conclude on the time-varying policies, we use in the state 
space the unemployment duration, d, (recall that there is a 
one-to-one mapping between the two states). Figure 2 shows 
the optimal policy within the LFA set on the (U,h) state space.
For low levels of U the planner assigns the worker fi rst 
to UI because the effort cost is relatively low and the human 
capital level that determines the success of UI is relatively 
high. As human capital depreciates (still for low levels of 
promised utility) the job-search probability decreases and the 
planner shifts from UI to TW where both the employment 
probability and the secondary production are independent of 
the human capital level. Finally, as human capital further de-
preciates, the return to matching decreases because employ-
ment’s production depends on human capital and the planner 
gives up on the matching activity, leading the planner to 
choose MW.
For higher levels of promised utility the planner shifts 
from UI to policies that do not require the worker’s effort 
since the effort compensation cost is to too high. Note that 
the shift from UI to JA at high levels of U can happen even 
when π(h)≠λ. This is the case because either the effort cost at 
high levels of U is too high (π(h)<λ) or the matching cost is 
too high (π(h)>λ).
Figure 3 shows the optimal policy within the HCD set 
on the (U,h) state space. The transitions between UI, JA, 
and SA are the same as above. When moving horizontally 
(along h) at low levels of U, the planner shifts from UI to OT 
because as h depreciates, the return for OT increases because 
the human capital upgrade increases. Matching is used only 
at intermediary levels of h because its return as leading to 
employment decreases with the decrease of human capital.
The third goal of the chapter is of a normative nature. We 
evaluate existing U.S. programs by comparing them to the 
effi cient program. We calibrate the labor market parameters 
and the various technology parameters by using the NEWWS 
dataset’s treatment-control groups to perform a standard as-
sessment of the effectiveness of each technology. We assess 
whether each training policy is effective enough to be adopt-
ed within an optimal WTW program, and assess whether its 
timing is consistent with the timing in the effi cient program.
Chapter 3: Unemployment Accounts
Unemployment accounts (UAs) are mandatory individual 
saving accounts that can be used by governments as an alter-
native to the UI system. The goal of this chapter is to study 
the welfare implications of a shift from the current UI system 
to a new UA system in the United States. The importance of 
Figure 3  Optimal Policies on the (U,h) State Space—HCD
Figure 2  Optimal Policies on the (U,h) State Space—LFA
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such a study is refl ected even in the precrisis 2007 statistics: 
state UI programs paid $32 billion in unemployment benefi ts 
to 7.6 million unemployed workers (U.S. Department of 
Labor 2008). As noted by Feldstein (2005), these policies are 
particularly important because of their impact on macroeco-
nomic performance. Using a calibrated structural model, I 
provide a quantitative analysis of both the average and the 
distributional welfare effects of a shift from UI to UA.
UA work as follows. During employment, the worker is 
mandated to save a fraction of her labor income in an indi-
vidual saving account. The worker is entitled to withdraw 
payments as a fraction of her last earnings (a “replacement 
rate”) from this account only during unemployment. At 
retirement the residual balance is transferred to the worker. 
A system of UA was implemented in Chile in 2002, and it is 
debated whether such a system should be implemented in the 
United States and in other countries, e.g., Feldstein (2005), 
Orszag and Snower (2002), and Sehnbruch (2004).
Figure 4 shows a graphic representation of the UA system 
for a worker who starts off employed, becomes unemployed, 
and remains unemployed indefi nitely. The bottom panel of 
the fi gure shows the balance of the unemployment account. 
The balance is zero at the starting point, increases gradu-
ally during employment and then declines gradually during 
unemployment. Once the balance is exhausted the account 
remains at its lower bound of 0. The top panel of Figure 
4 shows the withdrawals and transfers associated with the 
unemployment system for that worker. During employment 
the worker pays her mandated contribution to the unemploy-
ment account. Upon unemployment, the worker withdraws 
payments from the account at a prespecifi ed rate until the 
account is exhausted. From that point onward the worker 
receives SA benefi ts.
In contrast to the UA system, UI is funded by a payroll 
tax, and benefi ts are a replacement rate for a limited duration. 
Figure 5 shows a graphic representation of the UI system for 
the same worker examined above. During employment, the 
worker pays an unemployment tax. Upon unemployment, the 
worker receives benefi ts proportional to her last earnings, for 
the duration of UI benefi ts. Once the time limit of benefi ts is 
reached, the worker receives SA benefi ts. Note that while the 
maximum duration of benefi ts in UI is fi xed, the duration of 
withdrawals in UA depends on the balance of the unemploy-
ment account at the beginning of the unemployment spell. 
This duration can be longer or shorter than the time limit of 
UI benefi ts. In other words, in UA it is the fi xed replacement 
rate and the initial balance, rather than a fi xed time limit, that 
determine the duration of payments.
Thus, the main difference between the two systems is 
the source of funding payments during unemployment: in 
UI payments are funded by a common fund, whereas in UA 
payments are funded by the worker’s own resources. At the 
same time, the two systems share two common principles: 
unemployment payments are provided for a limited duration, 
and payments are indexed to past earnings.
In order to study the welfare effects of a shift from UI to 
UA, I build a heterogeneous agents, incomplete-markets, 
life-cycle model, in which workers face income fl uctuations 
and unemployment shocks. Workers in the model differ 
along several key dimensions, including age, unemploy-
ment risk, income, and wealth. Unemployment in the model 
is driven both by exogenous factors (layoffs for employed 
workers and search frictions for unemployed workers) and 
endogenous decisions (job quits for employed workers and 
job-offer rejections for unemployed workers).
The government can implement either a UI or a UA 
system. The UI policy is modeled as a choice of a replace-
ment rate, and a time limit of unemployment benefi ts. The 
UA policy is modeled as a choice of a deposit rate into the 
account during employment and a withdrawal rate during 
unemployment. Workers who exhaust their unemployment 
payments in either policy regime (they reached the time 
limit in UI and they have a zero balance in UA) receive SA 
indefi nitely.
Given the unemployment policy, workers allocate their 
resources optimally between consumption and savings. In 
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Social 
assistance
 
Unemployment Time
UA deposit rate
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Figure 4  The UA System
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addition, workers with employment opportunities choose 
between employment and unemployment. The government 
takes into account these endogenous decisions when design-
ing the parameters of the unemployment system in order to 
maximize the welfare of the workers.
Under the UI system, labor supply decisions are distorted 
by the presence of unemployment benefi ts, which increases 
the value of being unemployed, and by the payroll tax 
required to fi nance unemployment benefi ts, which decreases 
the value of being employed. The main advantage of UA is 
that it alleviates this incentive problem.
On the other hand, the insurance provided by the UA 
policy may not be enough for two types of workers. The 
fi rst is young workers who start off with no mandatory sav-
ings. Upon unemployment, these workers would exhaust 
their mandatory account quickly and will only receive SA 
benefi ts. The second type of workers who are under insured 
in the UA regime is workers with consecutive unemployment 
spells. Such workers might not be able to replenish the man-
datory account during the employment interval between the 
unemployment spell. Thus, they will fi nd themselves with 
no unemployment payments in the upcoming unemploy-
ment spells. In contrast, such workers in UI would be equally 
insured for each unemployment spell. The underinsurance of 
these two groups of workers is especially important for poor 
workers who have limited ability to smooth their consump-
tion during unemployment.
These two opposite effects of UA, the improved incen-
tives and the reduced insurance, imply that the question of 
whether unemployment is “voluntary” is closely linked to 
the welfare implications of a shift from UI to UA. If workers 
choose to be unemployed, then UA can improve average ex 
ante welfare by increasing the employment level and de-
creasing the labor tax. If, however, workers are involuntarily 
unemployed due to exogenous frictions, such as the absence 
of job offers, then the UI system is preferred and the shift to 
the UA leads to a welfare loss, which is especially high for 
workers who enter the labor force with little wealth.
This observation puts the chapter at the nexus of the de-
bate on the level of disutility from work. This value is central 
in the determination of whether unemployment is mostly 
involuntary as assumed, for example, by Kitao, Ljungqvist, 
and Sargent (2008) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008), or 
mostly voluntary as assumed, for example, by Rogerson and 
Wallenius (2007) and Prescott, Rogerson, and Wallenius 
(2009).
I contribute to these debates by connecting my model with 
the extensive literature that studies the effect of variations in 
the UI policy on some observable moments. By matching the 
elasticity of average unemployment duration with respect to 
changes in UI benefi ts, I provide a convincing point estimate 
for disutility from work.
Using this estimate I show that the shift from UI to UA 
leads to an average ex ante welfare gain of 0.9 percent 
of lifetime consumption. This shift makes workers in all 
quintiles of initial assets better off. Young workers, however, 
are worse off because they have low balances of mandatory 
accounts.
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